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Industrial mass production on the basis of cheap raw material and fossil fuels, 
which has evolved as the economic Leitbild of the 20th century has reached its 
critical limits. The environmental impacts of fossil fuels are threatening both 
the environment and further economic development. Changes in the energy and 
resource base of the economy have been the drivers of productivity: Coal in the 
first Industrial Revolution at the end of the 18th century and Oil at the beginning 
of the 20th century. These shifts in fuel base of industry  were linked to mutually 
enforcing technical, social and political innovations. 
There are indications that we are at the advent of another change in the energy 
base. The recent strong growth of renewable energies and eco-efficient tech-
nologies are the most visible manifestations of an upheaval. What are the impli-
cations for societies and for the steering of such radical change? Industrial 
transformations of this kind cause a re-valuation of capital, professional skills 
and redistribution of wealth among sectors and regions. This is reflected in po-
litical resistance against such transformations.  
In our essay we analyse the opportunities for a political steering of industrial 
transformation. The large economic regions of the world are compared regard-
ing their abilities to take a leading role on this. The technological competences, 
the availability of capital, the abilities to compensate social disruptions, the 
openness for innovation and the ambitions in environmental policies provide a 





“I believe we are now standing on the 
brink of a Third Industrial Revolution: the 
Low Carbon Age. Like the previous indus-
trial revolutions, this will be driven by 
technology and new forms of energy. It 
will also transform our societies”. (José 
Barroso, President of the European Com-
mission in his speech held on October 1st, 
2007). 
What we need is a “New Deal” of eco-
nomic-, environmental- and employment 
policy. Innovations are its core, a “Third 
Industrial Revolution”. (Sigmar Gabriel, 
2006, German Environment Minister). 
 
Industrial mass production based on cheap raw materials, which became the 
dominant economic and societal model in the 20th century and fundamentally 
changed the face of the world, has indeed reached its critical limits. Fossil fuels 
played a specific role in changes, lending an immense productivity to labor in 
both the First (coal) and Second Industrial Revolution (oil), as well as profoundly 
changing the technological and economic conditions for transport, production 
and consumption. However, the impact of fossil fuels on the environment and 
climate has proven to be destructive, and the practice of replacing labor with 
cheap energy can no longer be continued. Critical disturbances in the markets 
become more and more visible, e.g., the skyrocketing price of oil. At the same 
time, knowledge of new technological breakthroughs regarding the utilization of 
renewable energies is also expanding. The unexpectedly strong growth of re-
newable energies and eco-efficient technologies are the most visible manifesta-
tions of an upheaval. As a result, resource-intensive mass production in general 
is subject to massive pressure towards innovation.  
This situation can be compared with the big industrial transitions of the last two 
centuries: The transformation from an agricultural-based society to an indus-
trial society, which began in England at the end of the 18th Century, was initially 
inseparable from the development of coal as an energy source.  In the 1920s this 
revolution continued with the use of oil and electricity. These former industrial 
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revolutions also had preceding phases in which new technologies and basic in-
novations (e.g. Mensch 1975; e.g. Olson 1982; Huber 1985; Greenwood 1999) were 
developed and prepared for the market. Through the competition between old 
and new technologies and in the conflict between old and new paradigms of in-
dustrial production a new growth pattern and balance was found. The historical 
examples show that in each case of major industrial transformations, new tech-
nology and industry clusters emerged, which served as drivers for economic de-
velopment and employment (see 4.1). Furthermore, technological transforma-
tions of this scale have always been linked with far-reaching social change and 
new conceptions of state and society. The current transformation is about the 
development and the efficient use of renewable energy sources. 
A broad upheaval, which does not only affect the energy- and raw material base 
but also important sectors of industry, can therefore be understood as an indus-
trial revolution. However, despite the similarities to previous industrial revolu-
tions, the current revolution has a new urgency. Climate change, the critical de-
velopment of energy, raw material and food prices create a comprehensive and 
immediate global need for change - one that is without precedent. Far reaching 
governmental and societal steering mechanisms are needed in order to cope 
with the upheaval. 
What are the dimensions of what is referred to by the President of the European 
Commission, the German Environment Minister and even the Chinese media, 
as the Third Industrial Revolution? What are the driving forces? What govern-
mental and societal steering is possible? Which institutions can cope with the 
challenges and which are necessary? Can politics accelerate the change, use the 
opportunities it offers, and minimize its destructive potential? Can Europe con-
tinue to develop its current global leadership in environmental and climate pro-
tection towards shaping this global process in a significant way? The authors of 
this contribution would like to give their input for discussion. 
In our paper, we assume that after a long phase of technological innovation to-
wards the substitution of fossil energy and exhaustible raw materials, which 
started with the first oil crisis (1973), a phase of radically accelerated transforma-
tion now lies ahead. We expect that the starting point will be in Europe. In addi-
tion to the technological competence and the necessary capital available here, 
there is also a relatively demanding regulative environment which is simultane-
ously open to innovation. Those are three conditions necessary for rapid change 
to occur, but unfortunately they are not sufficient to guarantee success. There is 
a risk that conventional structures could weaken the dynamic, thereby only al-
A Third Industrial Revolution? 
 3 
lowing for limited or marginal improvements to the status quo.  Finally, such a 
disruptive development has the risk of devaluing investments and related skills 
in currently dominating sectors and regions. In order to assure that the immi-
nent Third Industrial Revolution will not be accompanied by distortions and 
social conflicts similar to those experienced during the First Industrial Revolu-
tion, there is a need for broad steering and decisive action. The relationship be-
tween economic markets and the state, which was for a long time characterized 
by the withdrawal of the state from the economic process, needs to be reas-
sessed. 
2 The concept of  “Industrial Revolution” 
The term “Third Industrial Revolution” (see also Schellnhuber 2007; Hawken 
2008; Rifkin 2008) refers to a comprehensive upheaval, which was already la-
beled by other authors as a “green industrial revolution”, “efficiency revolution” 
and a fundamental transformation towards “green capitalism” (Schmidheiny 
1992; von Weizsäcker, Lovins et al. 1997; Hawken, Lovins et al. 1999). The US 
president elect Obama postulates a “green energy revolution”. And the IEA 
(2008) refers to a global “energy technology revolution” in a narrow sense. Some 
authors have used the term “industrial revolution” without addressing the envi-
ronment as a central theme. (e.g.Greenwood 1999; Freeman und Louca 2001). 
These different contributions all stress the radical nature of both the necessary 
and possible technical change.  Furthermore, they all share an expectation of 
phases of abrupt change. In general, two different understandings of the concept 
of “Industrial Revolution” can be identified. Whereas the narrow understanding 
only refers to the change of the energy base, the broader assessment includes the 
comprehensive changes in energy, technological, ecological and social condi-
tions and the necessary governmental leadership.   
“Industrial Revolution” should be perceived as a radical and abrupt but also 
long-lasting (“secular”) change at all levels of society. Due to fundamental tech-
nical innovations in the energy field, especially in generation and utilization, a 
new balance between the economy and the institutional framework is develop-
ing.  Historians and economists coined the term “innovation cluster“ to express 
the extent of this innovation process (Grübler 1998; Mokyr 1999). Reciprocal ini-
tiation-, multiplication- and acceleration effects within the cluster lead to eco-
nomic growth, employment and a broad modernization of national economies. 
Industrial revolutions have always had a critical preceding phase in which tradi-
tional technologies and production methods depleted their potential for further 
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improvements while new technologies were being developed. In this phase, both 
radically new technical and social inventions are also made which become ap-
parent in the industrial revolution as a radical “paradigm change” and after-
wards enable a stable development over a longer period.  Thus, industrial revo-
lutions are also the result of radically innovative answers to development crises 
in the global economy. 
The observation of long cycles of  “industrial revolutions,” which went hand in 
hand with the utilization of new sources for energy (coal at the end of the 18th 
century and oil at the end of the 19th century) has to be differentiated from the 
“long waves” observed by Kontradieff and Schumpeter. Both refer to the intro-
duction of the steam engine as the initial point of industrialization. “Long 
waves” refer to comparatively shorter cyclical fluctuations of growth rates, which 
are linked to a broad spectrum of fundamental innovations, and are not re-
stricted to the energy sector. As early as the 1920s, Kondratieff, using statistical 
analysis of economic data, identified long-term growth cycles with a length of 
40-60 years in industrialized countries.  What was remarkable about this finding 
was that the author was only able to analyze a few countries and could not yet 
identify three completed ‘long waves’ since the beginning of industrialization. At 
the end of the 1930s, Joseph Schumpeter continued the work and after detecting 
a downturn of the third wave since the early period of industrialization (includ-
ing he crash of 1929), he began to speak of “Kondratieff cycles.” Schumpeter and 
later Gerhard Mensch (1975) explained the cycles with basic innovations. In the 
1980s, the conditions of the socio-political framework were increasingly drawn 
upon as an additional explanation (overview in Huber 1985). Similarly, another, 
now fifth, Kondratieff ‘wave’ is assumed to be behind the positive development 
of the global economy since the beginning of the 1990s (Freeman und Louca 
2001). It is questionable whether this approach can explain different regional 
and sector specific dynamics. However, the proven statistical regularities of 
long-term growth fluctuations and the high plausibility of its theoretical expla-
nation offer an important basis for estimating industrial cycles and their need 
for action.  
Numerous suggestions for categorizing and dividing such transitions can be 
found in the literature. These terms are especially meaningful if they define the 
relevant differences between the transitions.  The new production methods, 
means of transportation, raw material, energy base, and social changes of the 
First Industrial Revolution in the 18th century are very different from the mass 
production, mass communication and mass democracy of the Second Industrial 
Revolution in the 20th century, with its development of electrification, motoriza-
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tion, chemicalization, and use of concrete. Exactly these modes of industrial 
production have become shaky since the end of the 20th century. The limitations 
of the fossil energy base, which carried the first two industrial revolutions, has 
become apparent. The fact that clear alternatives have already been heralded jus-
tifies the concept of another, third industrial revolution. Thus emphasizing the 
growing urgency of this transformation and the dramatic need for political 
steering.  
Table 1: From the First to the Third Industrial Revolution  
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racy, welfare state 
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globalization, global 
governance 
Core countries UK, Belgium, Germany, 
France 
USA, Japan, Germany EU, USA?, China? Japan? 
The current crisis of resource intensive growth – irrespective of innovative activ-
ity - extends beyond the current capabilities of markets and civil society to man-
age the crisis.  Framework conditions must change radically. This also applied to 
the first two industrial revolutions. The first one, through its new requirements 
of free trade, property rights, market development and societal division of labor 
increased the pressure for the creation of the rule of law and the political par-
ticipation of citizens and the bourgeoisie (“liberal revolution”). The second – 
with its transition to mass production – necessitated a minimum of social stan-
dards and thus, social redistribution (“social revolution”) occurred. With the in-
troduction of social security systems the social costs of industrial labor, which 
had previously been largely externalized, were internalized or compensated to a 
certain degree. As a result, purchasing power emerged, which in turn allowed for 
vast growth. 
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The emergence of both the liberal state and the welfare state were characterized 
by serious conflicts, expressed by parties, social groups and ideologies. An im-
portant part of these conflicts was a re-evaluation of physical and human capital: 
Innovations regularly devalue investments, resources, and skills connected to 
them. Often those who are negatively affected fight against these changes politi-
cally.  
Similarly, the Third Industrial Revolution is not only a broad wave of innovation 
potentially accompanied by welfare effects. It is about typical innovation con-
flicts. Economic sectors, which have defined the exploitation of natural re-
sources as their commercial basis, see their existence threatened. They perceive 
this threat to be the competitive resource-saving and environmentally friendly 
technologies currently favored by civil society actors and regulatory measures.  
At the same time compared to the innovators, the old sectors often have an ad-
vantage in terms of political influence, which they were able to gather in the 
previous boom. That is why “old industries” are often quite powerful. However, 
with the increasing technical and economic maturity of competing technologies, 
the political pressure on the affected sectors will increase, and in the end the 
capital flows reorient themselves in favor of new technologies. Continuing to 
generate electricity from coal, to promote nuclear power, and to disregard en-
ergy-saving and environmental protection in the automobile industry clearly 
show that there are relentless influential advocates for the conventional model 
of growth.  These advocates are avoiding the pressure of innovation – very often 
with political support. 
All industrial revolutions so far were accompanied by the development of new 
functions and capacities of the state apparatus. The Second Industrial Revolu-
tion e. g. was connected with the extension of national state activity and public 
finance. This tendency was embodied in “Wagner’s law,” which was the remark-
able long-term forecast of an ”increased need for state activity” (Wagner 1893). 
Social core functions have been added to the economic core functions of the lib-
eral state. Both functions being represented also in the structure of interest 
groups and the political party spectrum.  
Since the 1970s in industrialized countries and the 1990s on a global level, a 
third basic state function in addition to the core economic and social duties has 
emerged.  This new undertaking is in most cases even anchored in the constitu-
tion: the protection of the natural bases of life. In this sense many industrialized 
countries and the EU have taken important steps towards an “environmental 
state”. This movement again is grounded in the political party spectrum as well 
A Third Industrial Revolution? 
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as in the social institutional arrangement – German environmental organiza-
tions have nearly as many members as the trade unions (Jänicke 2007). Pioneer-
ing states which are leaders in this respect participate more intensively in inter-
national political processes and have political systems that tend to be more open 
towards new interests. Interestingly enough, these states are also more competi-
tive on a global scale (Esty und Porter 2000). 
All three industrial revolutions also represent significant gains in importance of 
the global market. Already in the Communist Manifesto (1948) it was stated that 
the big industries were the ones that created the global market.  Industrializa-
tion in its current state was only possible by building infrastructures that could 
transport energy sources, raw materials and final goods to and from remote ar-
eas of the world at low prices unimaginable until then. The emergence of an in-
ternational (however fragmented) legal system is connected with this globaliza-
tion, and through standardization, regulation of cash and commodity flows, etc., 
it represents another functional basis for global markets. These regional and in-
ternational regimes are increasingly including environmental standards.  
At the same time, shifts of dominant countries and regions occur during the 
long-term cycles of industrial growth, a phenomenon which resulted in the 
theories of the “rise and decline of nations” (e.g. Olson 1982). The important 
centers of economic development in the early period of industrial development 
were England, Germany, France the Netherlands, and later Belgium. The USA 
took a central role in the technological dynamic with the Second Industrial 
Revolution. After the Second World War, Japan with its automobile, electrical 
and electronic industry also became one of the most important countries, shap-
ing mass production and consumption.  
There are high expectations for China and India in the third growth cycle. This 
emphasizes a phenomenon, which was evident in former industrial revolutions: 
the innovations, which cause the economic boom in a country, do not necessar-
ily have to be developed in that country.  Even the pioneers of industrialization 
in England used innovations that were made in France and Germany but not 
successfully merchandised there. The Japanese industrial strategy of the 1950s 
and 1960s of reverse engineering is another good example of the successful early 
adoption and marketing of foreign innovations. These examples show that it is 
not only the ingenuity of the invention that is relevant for their success, but also 
the general economic and political framework. A suitable example of this may be 
China, which seems to be studying technological developments in Western in-
dustrialized societies while building its own industries domestically. The re-
 Martin Jänicke and Klaus Jacob 
 8 
search, development, and testing of new technologies are oftentimes left to the 
industrial centers of Western Europe, North America or Japan.  
3 Challenges of a “Third Industrial Revolution” 
After a long-term decline since the first oil crisis (1973) the growth rates of the 
global economy have increased significantly since the the 1990s. This has been 
expected by advocates of long-term cycles with reference to Kondratieff (Mensch 
1975; Prognos AG, Schröder et al. 1982; Wallerstein 1983). The basic innovations 
for a long-term cycle are also visible – especially in the area of renewable ener-
gies, energy autarkic buildings and recycling procedures. As early as the begin-
ning of the 1970s, innovative concepts towards a knowledge-intensive, resource- 
and environmentally friendly production method were presented (MITI 1974), 
which are only now starting to be broadly accepted (SRU 2008). But this devel-
opment is so far nothing more than an opportunity. Unless the innovation 
process and the economic dynamics are given a direction towards environmen-
tally friendly and resource saving technologies, and the speed of the technical 
process is accelerated, the economic and ecological problems of resource-
intensive mass production will not be overcome. The challenge is much more 
serious than the previous one. In addition, the required scale of innovation ex-
ceeds previous experiences in the area of climate, energy, and resources as well 
as the existing steering capacities of states and companies.  
The serious recessions (1975, 1982, 1993) during the previous decades have dem-
onstrated that the production methods of the 20th century have reached their 
limits, both economically and ecologically (strinkingly addressed by Meadows, 
Meadows et al. 1972). Support for this conclusion has dramatically increased due 
to the alarming climate change and the renewed energy price explosion. This 
situation can be compared to the challenge facing Western democracies during 
the Second World War and their tremendous achievements defending them-
selves against a deadly aggression (moral equivalent to war). The increasingly 
unequal income distribution further strengthens the general demand for 
change.  
However, these challenges are also accompanied by opportunities and an im-
pressive potential for innovation (see section 4). Instead of former anarchic and 
crisis-ridden, destructive upheavals we are now – for the first time – looking at 
the possibility of a targeted, politically re-enforced and structured change on a 
broad social basis and at all levels of the global system.  
A Third Industrial Revolution? 
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3.1 Economic challenges: resource scarcity and increasing 
environmental cost 
The limited availability of finite cheap raw materials and, in particular, of fossil 
energies has reached its natural limit of growth. The present crisis of the car in-
dustry is only a symptom. Also, the high economics dynamics of the newly in-
dustrialized countries are impacting the development of prices: oil, copper, and 
steel are spectacular examples. Similar demand and price surges are to be ex-
pected for other raw materials. Speculative mark-ups do not have to remain a 
price component indefinitely, and declines can be expected at least temporarily. 
Nevertheless, markets react to long-term scarcities of raw materials and fossil 
energies. Resource efficiency becomes imperative for economic development, 
and is an indicator of success in the competition for innovations.  
Even with renewable raw materials we can see limits of availability: The land-use 
competition between food and bio-fuels is just one example. The extension of 
farmland at the expense of unspoiled natural lands another. However, the strug-
gle for land is not limited to competition between food and fuels alone. Renew-
able raw materials play an ever-greater role in the production of chemicals. Tra-
ditional users of biotic raw materials, be it the paper, furniture or building in-
dustries, are also interested in growth. 
According to the UN Global International Water Assessment (UNEP and GIWA 
2006) the availability of water will dramatically shrink due to changes in land 
use, climate change, pollution, overuse of drinking water, and further increases 
in industrial and agricultural demand in many parts of the world. Steppe forma-
tion and desertification are expected in numerous regions, which further in-
crease the strain on the remaining fertile areas. Already current weather events 
have repeatedly devastated the food resources of many countries and regions. 
The scarcity of sinks for environmental pollutants presents the discernible limit 
to economic growth. According to governmental calculations environmental 
costs threaten to neutralize economic gains in wealth. Also in countries like 
Spain, the overuse of natural capital is a perceptible limit to economic develop-
ment. 
3.2 Ecological challenges: climate change and critical loss of 
natural capital 
Global assessments of the state of the environment, be it the report from the 
IPCC, the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment or the Global Environmental Out-
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look, show that the carrying capacity of the Earth in many regions, and the im-
pacts of climate change on a global level have reached critical limits. Yet, it is not 
a steady development.  Instead, there are “tipping points” – at which point limits 
are exceeded, and developments possessed of an incalculable and volatile self-
perpetuating momentum are set in motion.  The drying out of the Amazon Ba-
sin, the melting of the Antarctic ice, the cease of the Gulf Stream and the melt-
ing of the permafrost in Siberia with large scale emissions of embedded meth-
ane are all critical areas affected by such self re-enforcing feedback mechanisms. 
The United Nations Millennium Ecosystem Assessment in 2005 concluded that 
most of the ecosystem services are in a state of advanced or continuous degrada-
tion (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005). Central functions of nature, es-
sential to both the preservation of life and economic systems, seem to be threat-
ened. We live from the very substance of the planet itself. 
All of the current major assessments of the state of the environment, in spite of 
the regional differences, expect a serious global economic-ecological crisis and 
are calling for major changes to avoid the economic impacts. The costs of the 
damage due to climate change, including loss of biodiversity and natural re-
sources, were calculated if climate protection is neglected: global GDP will de-
crease by 5-20% according to the Stern Report (Stern 2007) and by an additional 
6% until 2050 due to global deforestation (European Communities 2008). How-
ever, these and other calculations for the cost of damages are methodically 
judged: there can be no doubt that the resource-intensive growth pattern of the 
Second Industrial Revolution, particularly when its counterproductive economic 
effects are taken into account, cannot be sustained. 
3.3 Social challenges: supporting the processes of modernization 
with social-policy 
The Second Industrial Revolution in the beginning of the 20th century allowed 
mass production to be accompanied by mass income, which supported the req-
uisite trend of demand. As a result, a radical change of income distribution, the 
introduction of union rights and social security were necessary; these often 
emerged after political upheavals, such as in many European countries in 1918. 
The worldwide development of mass markets from the 1950s onwards, led to a 
rapid increase in the use of natural resources and emission releases. The prom-
ises of freedom through mobility, home ownership, and other symbols of the 
“Western” economic miracle have spread worldwide and have now reached the 
limits of natural resources.  
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The internalization of social costs of labor with the help of social security sys-
tems gave a strong incentive to reduce the labor factor. This was accompanied by 
a rapid development of labor productivity which caused structural unemploy-
ment in the 20th century. Economic crises and their social impacts not only pose 
a threat to mass purchasing power, but also deter the acceptance of more ambi-
tious efforts to protect the environment and resources. Furthermore, a broad re-
distribution at the expense of those in lower incomes has been pushed through 
in the name of globalization. The question of fairness in the distribution of 
wealth and resources is also relevant to the fact that the increasing consumption 
of luxury goods (e.g. vehicles) is linked to additional environmental pollution. 
The age pyramid of developed industrialized countries also creates critical chal-
lenges for social security systems. Another challenge of the 21st century is the 
dramatically increasing knowledge intensity of production in the face of critical 
deficits in human capital. 
At the same time, the necessary change does not come without a price. The 
transformation collides conventional perspectives of development and growth 
in traditional economic branches. Traditional business sectors, their invest-
ments, their employees, and their skills are in danger of being questioned due to 
the rise in energy and raw material prices, and more demanding standards. In 
the long-term renewable energies and renewable raw materials are potential 
sources of prosperity. Yet, the necessary funds for the development threaten to 
aggravate current inequality. The costs of environmental pollution and the costs 
of solutions could easily be dumped on those social classes, which only have a 
limited opportunity to raise concerns (Weidner 2007). This does not only 
threaten the acceptance of environmental policy but also the long-term purchas-
ing power of lower socio-economic classes. Thus, the broad acceptance of com-
prehensive industrial modernization also has to be secured on a socio-political 
level. 
3.4 Excessive demands on the steering mechanisms 
The first two industrial revolutions were characterized by a profound change of 
the concept of statehood. The present industrial revolution again represents 
fundamental changes in the political system and ways to respond to newly 
emerged problems and claims. This could already by observed in the multi-
level-system of global politics, especially since the 1990s (e. g. the UN summit in 
Rio). But the extend of the challenges and the resistance of conventional inter-
ests show an excessive demand on steering mechanisms. This is demonstrated 
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by striking contradictions in the area of climate protection. On the one hand, 
the global public and politicians are terrified by the results of the 4th IPCC re-
port (2007). At the same time many countries invest primarily in coal-power (a 
capacity growth of 60 percent is expected till 2020) and investments in energy-
efficiency and renewable energies are often neglected. Although most states have 
institutionalized environmental targets, they are clearly in a weaker position 
compared to the rights of an individual. In general, there is now a broad societal 
consensus that environmental protection is needed, but in reality, when there is 
a conflict of interest decisions are often made at the expense of the environ-
ment. Thus far environmental policy has rather focused on "win-win" situations 
in which efficiency gains and environmental benefits can also be obtained from 
a microeconomic perspective.  
The particular difficulties of environmental policy – limited capacity for inter-
vention in the case of private property, spatial and temporal divergence of cause 
and effect in the case of environmental problems, and the difficulty in coordi-
nating players from different political fields and operational levels - have all cre-
ated numerous policy innovations that extend the capacity for action. Environ-
mental policy, with its new forms of policy innovation and new instruments, is a 
prime example (Jacob, Feindt et al. 2007). This includes the significance of calcu-
lable target-setting, the internationalization of environmental policy, the inclu-
sion of private players and the development of new market-based and regulative 
instruments (Jänicke 2007). While the areas of modern environmental policy are 
broadened even further, the complexity of actor constellation has dramatically 
increased. Therefore, the question of final responsibility has become critical – if 
all are responsible, then nobody is. Nation states, both individually and collec-
tively as member states, can assert that they have adopted a responsible role, but 
their role in the European and global context is not clear so far.  
By and large, the challenges of the Third Industrial Revolution prove to be chal-
lenges for governmental and societal steering. The radical change requires (1) 
competent and globally networked governments capable of strategic action, (2) 
informed voters and consumers open to innovation, (3) a significantly higher 
degree of readiness for innovation on the part of companies and national 
economies, and (4) a highly productive system of innovation. These prerequisites 
first needs to be met. 
3.4.1 Competent and strategic governments  
The Third Industrial Revolution requires multi-level political systems with an 
extraordinary capacity to act. It is first and foremost a matter for the states, as 
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there is no alternative to their legitimate powers and responsibility to pursue 
long-term public interests. Even though governments have become active in na-
tional and international networks, it does not change their importance as le-
gitimate national players. States still possess considerable resources and exper-
tise. In a crisis, the population always holds the state responsible first. Neverthe-
less, there is a lack of necessary strategic capability. Such capabilities are the 
ability of states to establish long-term public interest policies in spite of short-
term special interests. Short-term special interests are often concerns of tradi-
tional industries and social groups which consider the long-term change to be a 
threat. Such persistent interests often have attained an influential position, 
which innovative new sectors have not yet been able to achieve. Thus, in many 
countries providers of fossil fuels are capable of hindering an active climate pol-
icy. Innovations are also always ambivalent processes during which innovators 
face the resistance of the “dinosaurs,” or established interests. There is no other 
explanation for the remarkably slow innovation process in the areas of eco-
efficient technologies over the last thirty years (Jänicke 2008). In many states the 
conditions for action are impaired due to unsolved social problems which 
dominate public awareness.  Also, in many places the role of the commercial 
media hampers an adequate understanding of the need for intervention meas-
ures in energy policy. Long-term policy orientation is a challenge for the tradi-
tional policy inclination towards short-term economic and political cycles. 
A policy that affects people’s lives and interests must be able to legitimize its in-
terventions and distinguish between different protected commodities. Democ-
ratic governments often succumb to self-restriction which was created two cen-
turies ago to protect against the absolute state. Another common obstacle effec-
tive worldwide is the neo-liberal doctrine of “deregulation,” “denationalization,” 
or “tax cuts,” which is based on the assumption that a general retreat of state in-
fluence would improve economic growth, innovation and welfare. This doctrine 
- regularly ignoring irrational actions in the business sector (banks, automobile 
or power industry) – is the wrong answer to the increasing steering demands of 
expertise, regulatory intelligence and financial budget of states. Although the 
neo-liberal doctrine has reasonably broached the issue of bureaucracy, it has 
largely underestimated the function of governmental regulation in the market 
economy. The general discrediting of government influence is questionable, 
particularly considering that many studies deem the imminent environmental 
and energy-technical revolution to be especially policy-driven (European Com-
mission DG Environment und Ernst & Young 2006; IPCC 2007; Jänicke 2007; 
IEA 2008). Against this background the re-discovery of the regulatory role of the 
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state as a functional condition (“regulatory capitalism”) is hardly astonishing 
(Majone 1997; Moran 2003; Levi-Faur 2005). 
3.4.2 Voters and consumers open to innovation 
The basic conditions for a radical shift in awareness are still largely missing. 
The tendency to redistribute income at the expense of the middle and lower in-
come groups produces an unfavorable condition to begin innovation among 
voters and consumers.  People suffering in poverty have priorities other then 
climate protection. Together with deficits in education, the risk of social decline 
is a feeding ground for the populist media which gives up their function as a 
democratic safeguard – e.g. in fighting corruption – to be reduced to routine 
witch-hunts of “the politicians.” The role of the media as a transport mecha-
nism for relevant knowledge is as important for handling the industrial revolu-
tion as for the new production model, which is based more on knowledge than 
on cheap resources. The media must contribute to the knowledge that is neces-
sary for consumers as well as voters to support innovative products and policies.  
If policies fail to address the challenges of climate change and resource scarcity, 
the mechanisms of democratic decision-making could be called into question. 
The impending economic and ecological crises could be attributed to the al-
leged slowness of the democratic decision-making process, and thus encourage 
authoritative forms of statehood. Such a reaction, however, underestimates the 
innovative potential contained in political competition and opportunities for 
civil society to participate. It is no coincidence that authoritative systems failed 
to protect the environment. The openness of political systems to new interests, 
despite the difficulties this entails, is a central prerequisite for political innova-
tion and problem solving.  
3.4.3 Innovative enterprises with a long-term perspective and good 
governance 
Shortsightedness, the orientation towards shareholder-value, and short-cycles 
also present an obstacle to innovation in the business sector. But innovation are 
essential in the present economic crisis. The assumption that rational, informed 
companies will use their efficiency potential in production out of self-interest, 
and adapt their energy and resource consumption accordingly, is not generally 
confirmed by reality. Empirical studies regularly show that economically sensi-
ble investments in energy-efficiency are not made because of missing informa-
tion, prevailing priorities, or dominating attitudes in a company hamper reori-
entation (e.g. KfW 2005).  
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It has to be mentioned that influential, large corporations often have the privi-
lege to ignore even obvious innovation needs. Many automobile corporations 
are reacting to the current development of oil prices and the need for climate 
protection in the same way as they did already in the 1970s.  
Adaptation problems: The pressure within companies to innovate during 
phases of technological transition has to be understood and implemented in 
decisions. However, this is oftentimes met with substantial resistance. Con-
trary to widespread assumptions, corporations often have problems adjust-
ing to obvious future needs. In the automobile industry General Motors may 
serve as an example. In June 2008 this corporation had to close several facto-
ries because the high-horsepower vehicles being produced were no longer 
selling. The corporation had encountered this problem before in the seven-
ties and should have been aware of it. As a former manager stated in 1980: 
“When we should have been planning to switch to smaller, more fuel-
efficient, lighter cars […], the GM management refused saying ‘We make 
more money on big cars’” (DeLorean 1980). 
Another obstacle to innovation occurs when companies with products of high 
environmental impacts, for example in the electricity industry, do not have ef-
fective incentives to help to reduce energy consumption in their field. The nor-
mal reaction to energy saving of consumers will be new marketing strategies to 
generate more energy consumption.   
Furthermore, financial markets primarily favor short-term profits. An orienta-
tion toward a long-term development of the company is impaired by having to 
demonstrate profit in very short period. Some countries experimenting with re-
porting commitments to long-term environmental effects of financial assets (e.g. 
for pension funds in Great Britain). In any case, stronger additional incentives 
are necessary to encourage the actual use of these mechanisms. Meanwhile there 
are many governance mechanisms that are being developed like environmental 
labels, standards for environmental management systems or report- and infor-
mation duty. But only in combination with regulatory standards can these 
mechanisms be effective (Hey et al.2008).  
3.4.4 A powerful innovation system 
The challenges of a comprehensive technical-economic change require the de-
velopment of adequate education and science systems to increase our human-
capital, knowledge, and qualifications. The PISA study on the education system 
and numerous evaluations of the science system prove however that many coun-
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tries (e. g. Germany) are not taking advantage of this potential. For example, it 
has been reported that the lack of well-trained skilled workers is an obstacle to 
further development of environmental technologies. The demographic change 
will aggravate this problem even further if education and research institutions 
do not do a better job of orientating themselves towards the new challenges. 
This applies to both vocational courses and further training.  
The importance of educational-, science- and technology policy for the success-
ful development of technologies, sectors and industrial development cannot be 
stressed enough. There is also a need for increased public spending on R&D and 
flexibility to advance (i.e. through a broad pre-structuring in funding) relevant 
future innovations.  
Many countries have committed themselves to what is in some cases a remark-
able increase in spending on research and development. The best example of 
this is the ambitious goal of the Lisbon strategy of the European Union to in-
crease spending for research and development to 3% of GDP. However, ap-
proaches, which only add further innovation programs for environmental tech-
nologies to the existing ones, will fail to meet the challenges. Apart from pro-
moting environmental technologies in the narrower sense, it is also necessary to 
consider environmental aspects in all technology fields.  
3.5 Possibilities of failure 
Given the extent of the resource-intensive growth crisis, failure is certainly pos-
sible. Markets, societies and states may not react sufficiently and may constrain 
themselves to the usual level of innovation. By this they will overstep the natural 
limits, and thus cause irreversible damage. Increasing the amount of electricity 
generated by coal will lead in that direction (as far as CCS is not technically pos-
sible and a legal requirement). It may well raise the belief, that the potential of 
the existing technologies is sufficient. There is the tendency to leave dominant 
large scale structures and trajectories untouched or even praise them as the so-
lution to the problem. One example is the discussion about a renaissance of nu-
clear power or the so called “geo-engineering”. An argument for this is that both 
can increase the capacity of absorbing climate gases or reduce solar radiation. 
Such approaches are very risky and comparatively expensive. In addition, this 
idea postpones solving the urgent crisis and ignores the complexity of resource 
and environmental problems.  
In the end it is about two different types of innovation: incremental innovations 
and radically new innovations. The former reinforces the successful industries 
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of the past and emerges from ancient branches and power structures. The latter 
enables existing structures to adapt to new requirements or to search for coun-
tries that are open to new structuring. This difference in the types of innova-
tions will result in the rise and fall of nations and regions. Over the last 200 
years, dynamic innovations have occurred due to the fact that old structures 
were left behind and new, open structures were preferred.  
4 Opportunities 
In order to avoid undesirable development, the structure of opportunities and 
its possibilities to enforce the trend should now be outlined. As has been the 
case in previous growth cycles, the crises of the current resource-intensive 
growth model, stands face-to-face with the opportunities of a new development 
model. For the first time there is an opportunity to politically shape this radical 
industrial change without the destructive forms of past breaks in development. 
4.1 Opportunities for economic-technological development 
Environmentally-friendly, resource-efficient technologies have the potential to 
become a lead-industry. This is comparable to the textile and iron industry in 
the early phase of the industrial revolution or the electrotechnic and automobile 
industry in later phases. Environmentally-friendly innovations are very impor-
tant because they are the basic condition of long-term industrial growth. To 
avoid environmental damage and deadweight loss, a growth process for techno-
logical environmental relief is needed more than ever. This goal can be met by 
accelerating a long-term innovation process, which is comparable to the con-
stant gain of labour productivity. Since environmental efficiency is a condition 
for long-term growth it offers at the same time the advantage of stable global 
markets.  
From an ecological standpoint, new basic innovations in the area of mobility, 
energy supply, agriculture, recycling, chemistry and telecommunications, which 
facilitate or are linked to a radically lower energy and resource consumption, are 
necessary. A measure of the real opportunities of such a development can be 
found in the unusually high global growth in this sector. 
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Table 2: Worldwide growth of eco-efficient technologies  
Annual growth 2005-07: 
• PV (on-grid capacity, 2005-07): 51 % (7,8 GW). 
• Biodiesel (2005-07): 44 % (8 bn l) 
• Investment in renewables (2005-07): 30 % (66 bn $) 
• Wind power (capacity, 2005-07): 26 % (93 GW) 
Forecast (2020) 
• Solar power: 23 % 
• Hybrid vehicles: 22 % 
• Bioplastics: 22 % 
• Automatic sorting: 15 % 
(Based on: Roland Berger/ BMU 2007; REN21 2008)  
Industrial transformations have previously taken shape around industry clusters 
and their related key technologies. The clusters contribute above average to eco-
nomic growth and as a result, their share in overall economic output increases. 
At the heart of these innovation and growth processes were “macro-innovations” 
(Mokyr 1993), which in turn were supplemented or improved by a series of "mi-
cro-innovations". A typical diffusion curve includes a long warm-up with low 
growth rates before the rapid take-off phase occurs. In the initial phase im-
provement innovations have to be made, the necessary skills have to be taught, if 
applicable the infrastructures have to be built or adjusted, and the required capi-
tal has to be collected. In this phase, providers of new technologies also have to 
prevail against traditional technologies.  
An industrial transformation of this scale is inevitably connected to an eco-
nomic structural change. Companies, which do not engage in the new dynamics 
and re-invest their capital stocks as usual, face the risk of losing ground in fu-
ture markets. Radical innovation processes, too, are always ambivalent. They in-
evitably trigger oppositions, which have been overcome until now by a process 
of “creative destruction” (Schumpeter 1942). Another opportunity of the Third 
Industrial Revolution is that these oppositions can be overcome in more con-
structive ways, with less destruction of capital, and thus a higher acceptance. 
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4.2 Opportunities for environmental concerns 
Resource conservation is always environmental protection, whether it concerns 
the consumption of energy, resources, water, soil or “nature”. Climate change, in 
particular, calls for a broad new concept of resource use. Resource conservation 
also offers profitable solutions to a considerable extent – covering and exceeding 
the costs of damage prevention. 
Renewable energies and an increase in energy efficiency are crucial contribu-
tions to climate protection. At the same time, they offer the possibility of substi-
tuting expensive energy imports, and providing energy at an affordable price. If 
renewable energies and energy efficiency are firmly promoted and fossil ener-
gies are charged for their external damage, possibly through an emissions trad-
ing system, learning effects and economies of scale in favor of new efficient and 
renewable technologies, these technologies would be developed. These innova-
tions would in turn increase the potential for relative climate relief.  
Similarly, an efficient use of raw materials not only assists in increasing produc-
tivity but also environmental protection. The environment benefits from the re-
duction or substitution of material flows in many ways. Not least, because these 
are related to diverse burdens (transportation, secondary energy consumption, 
storage, dissipative losses), which are difficult to control without further regula-
tions. 
The development of a new energy and raw material base not only affects envi-
ronmental and energy technologies, but impacts the ecological modernization 
of the entire industry. However, it is particularly important to modernize the 
energy-, automotive-, air traffic-, chemical-, and construction sectors, which as 
measured by their added value and lifespan, especially pollute the environment 
and diminish resources. In the modernization of the construction sector, Ger-
many can serve as an example. Germany has invested 40 billion euros into en-
ergy-saving buildings and government support is expected to increase massively 
(Jochem, Jaeger et al. 2008). Most remarkably, the investment in climate friendly 
technologies and products alone amounts to 5 per cent of the German GDP 
(2005). The share is even rising due to the new climate and energy program 
(2007). So far a statistically quantifiable area of “environmental technology” of 
about 4 per cent of the GDP and 1,8 million employees (2006) was “visible” 
which, however, excluded most of the climate protection activities.  
Beyond this there is a broad ecological modernization of the whole industry that 
cannot be quantified and proceeds usually within the enterprises. Due to the 
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breadth of the environmental industry an English governmental study called it 
an “invisible industry” (DTI und DEFRA 2006). Such a mainstreaming of envi-
ronmental concerns is also not restricted to the technological products of a cer-
tain environmental sector. The potentials is considerably higher if efficiency 
improvements are not only undertaken within technology lines, but also if in-
novations occur with in basic functions and systems. The needs of habitation, 
sustentation, energy, and mobility have to be met, but this must not occur 
through existing dominant technologies. For example, mobility is not limited to 
the road traffic system and energy provision can be met through technical sav-
ings, etc.  
4.3 Opportunities for social reforms 
It seems that the redistribution of income during former economic recessions at 
the expense of the lower classes has reached the limit of social acceptance. The 
price increase of both energy and necessary provisions exacerbates the situation 
even further. As a result, there is a lack of readiness for innovation, and this is 
possibly the most serious obstacle to an ambitious innovation strategy. Fortu-
nately, positive experiences with reform concepts in this context already exist. 
The cutting of subsidies, which contribute to environmental pollution and the 
over-use of resources, is not just a potential improvement to the public spend-
ing structure of states, but can also stimulate innovations. The implementation 
of such spending improvements to sector specific innovation processes can be a 
sensible solution.  
Moreover, the basic question is whether the future decisive basis for public 
revenue should be labor income or resource consumption. If labor income is the 
main basis, the problem of mass unemployment will remain. Therefore, it is in 
general sensible to direct taxation towards environmental and resource con-
sumption. Environmentally related luxury taxes can be considered a source of 
revenue, which can assist in income redistribution policies. Such approaches 
further legitimize environmental policy. In the long run, it will be essential that 
those in the higher income brackets, who have received favorable treatment for a 
long time, will have to make a greater contribution to the investment in sustain-
able development. 
The accelerated transfer towards more knowledge-based and value-added pro-
ductive methods is a challenge for the education sector. The previously men-
tioned bottlenecks in the educational sector and in the vocational training of 
human capital also have to be overcome to ensure employment. In this respect 
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the first steps have already been made. Last but not least, the rapid growth in 
eco-efficient technologies clearly shows how future technological breakthroughs 
will be connected with qualification requirements and a broad employment po-
tential.  
4.4 Opportunities for an improved steering capacity 
Political globalization, with its indisputable restrictions on sovereignty, has re-
peatedly been interpreted as generally limiting steering capacities of nation 
states. What this interpretation does not consider is that the transfer of sover-
eignty rights occurs mostly voluntarily in the interest of collective action.  Also, 
nation states have constructed a multi-level-system that has important steering 
capacities in the areas of technology standardization and the regulation of 
transport and trade. These steering potentials, as seen in Europe (EU), between 
industrialized countries (OECD) and also globally (G8, UN), need to be expanded 
and put to use for ecological modernization. The countries of the world under 
the auspices of the UN summit in Rio (1992), i.e. at the start of the current indus-
trial cycle, introduced a broad spectrum of new regulations for environmental 
protection. These regulations apply to international agreements (on climate, 
biodiversity or Agenda 21) as well as to political innovations within the countries 
themselves. In the year 2000, for instance, 60 % of all countries had a ministry of 
the environment and 70 % had a sustainability strategy (see figure 1). These in-
novations should be the starting point for future strategies.  
The need to enhance the strategy capacity of governments and intergovernmen-
tal organizations benefits from a wide international network of policy actors. 
Nowadays, ministries of the environment are more connected to international 
politics and policies than most other departments. Another advantage of this 
wide network is the increasingly large number of players with potentially long-
term perspectives: international institutions, scientific institutions (e.g. climate 
research), environmental associations, as well as the participating state machin-
eries, are relatively independent of the short-term nature of election or business 
cycles. Finally, this also applies to jurisprudence. These institutions can mean-
ingfully complement the short-term perspectives of enterprises and democratic 
systems.  
Alongside the international institutions of environmental policy, other interna-
tional systems and agreements can be used as mechanisms to promote and es-
tablish environmental policy (Oberthür und Gehring 2006). 
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(Source: Busch und Jörgens 2005) 
Environmental targets are accepted in development collaborations and many 
times, they form an integral part of corresponding programs. Also the World 
Bank, despite being rightly criticized for individual projects, has taken impor-
tant steps towards environmental integration. Other international institutions, 
such as the WTO, which regulates trade and transport, still have a long way to 
go. Often the WTO requires ambitious product regulations by international 
trendsetters to be justified because they supposedly present an obstacle to com-
petition. Because of that, their global expansion and the subsequent diffusion of 
ecologically advanced technologies still meets obstacles. But the mechanism of 
policy diffusion also provides a decisive opportunity to overcome this obstacle 
(Vogel 1995; Oberthür und Gehring 2006; Holzinger, Knill et al. 2007). The 
European Union, which began as a economic union and has become a central 
player in environmental policy, serves to a certain extent as an example for the 
incremental greening of trade regimes and should work to extend this para-
digm.  
The potential for steering can also lie in a re-evaluation of the concept of state-
hood. Contrary to the neo-liberal paradigm (which has lead to many miscalcula-
tions in particular concerning environmental issues) the role of state admini-
strations, finances and regulations has to be re-determined. The necessary ex-
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pansion of statehood does not mean an arbitrary expansion of state budget. But 
not all options of state regulation have been fully exploited. The quality of gov-
ernance changes in era of knowledge-intensity. Above all, better regulation 
(smart regulation) is needed and less deregulation. A singular focus only on the 
cost estimate of regulation, as is commonly used, should be avoided. 
The general suspicion, that future decisions made by the government have a 
high probability of error, must be rejected. However, what is correct is that a 
strong governmental role in the Third Industrial Revolution merits precaution-
ary rules. The shortcomings of state action can be reduced through broad net-
working and evaluations on both the national and international levels. State laws 
should be made as simple as possible, flexible and restricted to a certain period 
of time. They should enable learning processes and corrections (Voss 2006). In-
vestment cycles should be respected - overheating of the economy should be 
avoided. Not deregulation but “intelligent” (smart) regulation is required. 
As seen in Germany and other pioneer countries, it is possible to promote eco-
efficient innovations and diffusive them into lead-markets (Beise und Rennings 
2003; Beise und Rennings 2003; Jacob, Beise et al. 2005). This is the precondition 
for a global change towards nature- and resource-saving technologies. Para-
mount is that developed countries and regions develop their internal markets 
for eco-efficient technologies and products. Various instruments are needed to 
promote innovation. Experience already demonstrates that a flexible mix of in-
struments that cover the entire innovation process from invention until diffu-
sion and back to invention is beneficial. 
The Japanese Top-Runner Program, in which after a certain amount of time the 
most efficient products in each category define the standards for all manufac-
turers, shows that ambitious and innovation-promoting regulation for the de-
velopment of specific improvements is possible. But it always depends on the 
general steering through the increasing costs of energy and raw material; the 
policies should not only favor a broad and efficient search process for better so-
lutions, but also reduce rebound-effects.  
Environmental innovations are no subject for dogmatism towards economic in-
struments or state regulation. Both types of instruments are necessary: regula-
tion to exploit specific potentials for innovation – and taxes, charges or emis-
sions trading to stimulate a general trend. 
Lead-markets for eco-efficient technologies in EU-countries, like Germany, 
should play a global role. These countries not only demonstrate that it is tech-
nologically and economically possible, but also politically. By designing its own 
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markets in this area, the EU has gained regulative dominance (e.g. the EURO-
norms for vehicles, the chemical legislation REACH or the recycling of elec-
tronic devices). This has in some cases led to foreign providers adapting these 
processes and thereby has influenced technological development outside the 
EU. As a result European environmental norms are adopted by other economic 
regions. This is the case also with some support programs, such as the German 
Renewable-Energy-Law, which was copied worldwide, including some US states. 
The knowledge base, the capital, and the political and institutional environment 
all contribute to give Europe the opportunity to actively shape the process of a 
third industrial revolution. That is the special chance within  the upcoming 
challenges.  
5 Perspectives: A European model for sustainable 
development 
A European strategy for an ecological, respectively sustainable industrial policy 
that positively addresses the challenges of the imminent pressure towards inno-
vation in the Third Industrial Revolution, and uses its potential comprehen-
sively, should follow the subsequent four basic goals:  
a) Economically it is about a new productivity model that opts for eco-efficient 
innovations, especially through resource-saving and knowledge-intensive tech-
nologies, and the labor factor accordingly. This new productivity model will in-
crease technical progress and human capital while it decreases resource con-
sumption. It should focus on the related acceleration of the technical progress 
and not on the increase in growth rates. Industrial policy should both allow eco-
efficient technologies to be compatible within a competitive market and should 
design markets with a long-term perspective and an ability to address global 
challenges.  
Such an industrial policy would prevent the effects of long-term ecological dam-
age and their costs. 
b) Environmental policies should promote an ambitious innovation process that 
ensures strong environmental relief. The innovations should produce a broad, 
absolute decoupling from related growth processes as opposed to only a relative 
improvement. The importance of these radical innovations is evident when, for 
example, buildings with incremental augmentation of energy efficiency or coal-
fired power plants with normal efficiency improvements, can handicap envi-
ronmental relief for decades. Furthermore, these technologies need to penetrate 
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the national as well as global market as much as possible. This assigns a central 
role to the European lead markets. In the end, the increase of environmental ef-
ficiency has to play a role for the innovation process very much like the increase 
of labor productivity. 
c) Socio-politically:  Ecological industrial policy should seek additional legiti-
macy for the ecological structural change by creating significantly fairer in-
comes, improving the tax system and easing the burden on the labor factor. Pov-
erty and the perceived injustice of living conditions are a bad basis for a radical 
change. That also applies to the education sector. Massive investments in educa-
tion and research are indispensable for knowledge-intensive growth. The con-
tinuous improvement of eco-efficiency of processes and products is particularly 
knowledge-intensive.  
d) This requires a comprehensive improvement in the steering capabilities and 
an enhancement of the strategy capacity of politics. It is about the capacity to en-
force long-term public interests over short-term special interests both politically 
as well as legally. This requires a qualified state apparatus, which is broadly 
linked to society and to the multi-level-system. Europeanization and globaliza-
tion can be used to this end, because both offer public interests a broad arena. 
Also, both grant importance to actors with long-term goals and outlooks (inter-
national organizations, academic institutions or networks of environmental ad-
ministration of states). A better steering capacity requires a social atmosphere 
that will accept radical chance. Furthermore, voters and consumers need to be 
better informed. The frequent failure of government when under pressure from 
the populist media demonstrates the need for media reform. The drift towards a 
“Berlusconization” of democracy in some countries needs to be decidedly coun-
teracted (see also Crouch 2008). Simultaneously, if politics intends to play a 
strong role, mechanisms have to be developed to minimize failures. The exten-
sive networking of decision-makers and the creation of a competent ex-ante as-
sessment are all of great importance. 
Among the large global regions the EU leads the way in the upcoming upheaval. 
The EU has comparatively good preconditions: environment and climate pro-
tection is not only a German success story but also one of European industries. 
In the global market, the EU has a big share in the areas of renewable energies, 
energy-efficiency, recycling technologies, railway transportation and water sup-
ply. As an innovative answer to the crisis of energy- and resource-intensive 
growth models the EU not only has the technological expertise and the neces-
sary capital but also a regulative environment that is both comparatively ambi-
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tious and at the same time open to innovations. The “constitution” of the EU 
gives the protection of the environment a comparably high priority.  As a result 
the EU is a trendsetter for environmental regulations in many other countries; 
its environmental standards have even curbed emissions in other regions of the 
world. Due to generous support for environmentally-efficient technologies like 
renewable energies, particularly in Germany, lead-markets have emerged in the 
EU and many of their products are in demand in international markets.  
The regulative dominance of the EU in respect to environment and climate pro-
tection is a chance to significantly define the global transformation process. Fi-
nally, the EU serves as a model because it was founded in the name of free trade 
and evolved as a powerful institution aiming at a “greening” of markets. 
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